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Transnationalizing Comparative Law
Some twenty years ago, one of the top law schools in the United States decided to
end all its courses in comparative and foreign law. This was done in the expectation
that the then-fashionable end of history would also mean the end of diversity of
legal systems and the global triumph of US law. Students of the future would merely
need to learn ‘law’ (which meant US law) and be able to practice anywhere in the
world. Needless to say, the prediction turned out to be premature. The school is
now, like every other US law school, advertising its special competence in
comparative law for its curriculum and for lawyers today.
We should remember that reports on the death of comparative law, as suggested by
the editors of this journal, are always, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly
exaggerated. 1 Comparative law does not die so easily. Nor, however, does it remain
unchanged. Rather, and unsurprisingly, comparative law is constantly evolving, in
imperfect parallel with the development of law, and society, at large. Lawrence
Rosen once suggested “we may have to renounce comparative law as we have at
times known it in order to save it.”2 But the truth is that comparative law will always
exist whether we (who is that anyway?) renounce it or not. If comparative lawyers
of old refuse to go along with changes, it merely means that others will do it for
them—grandiose economist for whom laws are mere data points for statistical
analysis; ambitious young US scholars of constitutional law with often scant
exposure to foreign societies and modes of thought but a keen interest in promoting
their causes; brilliant lovers of French poststructuralist thought and its propensity
for theory and meta-theory without the need to engage with actual foreign law. It is
easy to ridicule these new developments from the standpoint of traditional
comparative law. But what would be more helpful is to understand them as signs of
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a change in the discipline. And in order to understand change we need to
understand how comparative law was before we can have a sense of how it will be.

1) Comparative Law in the Age of the Nation State
What are reasons for this change? The most obvious reason is our ongoing paradigm
shift from what we called a Westphalian model of the world to a globalized
understanding of the world.3 In the Westphalian model, all law was either national
(state) law or international law. The model created three important factors for
comparative law,4 which we can date, very imprecisely, around 1600, 1800, and
1900, and which we can name, not much more precisely, as: state, positivism,
science.

a) The State
The first of these factors is the rise of the sovereign state—the idea that the state is
all-encompassing (Hobbes) and sovereign (Bodin). This implies the idea that the
state has the exclusive power to make law. As a consequence, the focus in
comparative law has come to be exclusively on states and their laws. Non-state laws
like religious laws or customary law have all but disappeared from such studies
(except when they were, as is the case with Islamic law in predominantly Muslim
countries, turned into state law); responsibility for them has been deferred to other
disciplines like religious studies or anthropology. Standard treatises on comparative
law may contain non-state laws such as religious laws or customary laws in the
discussion of legal families, but in microcomparison, these laws are all but
forgotten.5 The new lex mercatoria, regardless of whether it is an autonomous law
or (more plausibly) an amalgam of state and non-state law, is almost never looked at
for comparative purposes. Merely non-state codifications like the UNIDROIT
Principles of Comparative Law are considered. By and large, non-state law plays
practically no role in comparative law; the field remains largely blind to the growth
of global legal pluralism.

b) Positive Law
The second of these factors, namely the focus of comparative law on positive law,
did not happen at the exact same time, at least outside of public law.6 Private law in
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17th and 18th century Europe was still largely thought of as transnational;
comparisons were made, if at all, between Roman and Germanic law, but not
between the laws of different states. This idea that law is positive law resulted from
the expansion of the state’s law-making power to private law, a fruit of the
enlightenment that ripened fully with the French code civil of 1804. Legal positivism
does not mean merely legislation, in the tradition of législation comparée (although
comparative law has always given, and continues to give, disproportionate
prominence to those.). But it does mean a near exclusive focus on law as official
pronouncements in the name of the state. In an important way, the much-trumpeted
difference between “law in the books” and “law in action” that we find so important
in comparative law amounts to little more than the difference between scholarship
and legislation on the one hand and court decisions on the other. Law in society
rarely plays a role in traditional comparative law. It is sometimes said that the trend
to positive law meant the end of comparative law, because it made lawyers narrow
their focus from transnational to national law. This is only half-true. At the same
time, the idea that law, including private law, was something national, created the
possibility of difference between different laws, and as such made comparison
possible.

c) Legal Science
The third factor, the idea that comparative law can be done scientifically, emerged in
comparative law around the end of the 19th century, and in this limited sense the
frequent claim that comparative law was born at the Paris Congress of 1900 has
some justification.7. Of course, the rise of science and scientific method has a longer
prehistory, in Western thought generally and also in comparative law. But it was
arguably around 1900 that such an approach became generally accepted in the
discipline. This scientific approach thus used was, for many, an approach of
autonomous legal science, in this sense characterized by the German idea of
Rechtswissenschaft. Although some comparative lawyers at the time, especially in
France, flirted with the use of sociology, to a large extent the method of comparative
law was not so different from the method of law more generally. This is not to say
that comparative law had no critical aim, quite the contrary. Comparatists directed
their critique against national parochialism and backwardness. In this sense,
comparative law was a very modernist project.

2) Comparative Law in the Age of Transnationalism
These three aspects—a focus on state law, a focus on positive law, an emphasis on a
legal-scientific approach to comparative law—continue to dominate much
comparative law today. It is obvious that all three of them clash with the emergence
of globalization as the new paradigm to replace the Westphalian model.
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a) Beyond the State
The state has lost its exclusive role in the global sphere. It has not become
unimportant—some states have arguably increased their power and their
importance—but it has lost its independence. States have become, to use the
concept that Keohane and Nye popularized, interdependent; their role depends on
and in turn influences that of other states, and much of their activity now happens in
cooperation with other states. This is clearest in entities like the European Union or
the WTO that create separate supranational bodies, but it is true more generally. In
this context it matters also that states have become disaggregated, as Annemarie
Slaughter has demonstrated—rather than viewing the state as a uniform actor we
should look at the actions of its different agencies, which are sometimes in conflict
with each other. Moreover, we must learn to look not just at states as lawmakers but
also to focus on the significant lawmaking by non-state actors—arbitrators,
institutions (so-called rule-formulating agencies), multinational corporations, ethnic
communities, etc. In this context, religious law also reemerges as an important
object of comparative law.
All of this makes comparative law, if taken seriously, considerably more complex.
Not only do we need to account for a broader variety of laws and legal systems than
before. Moreover, and more importantly, we can no longer assume legal systems to
be entities that are independent from each other. A comparison of English and
French law, to use just a simple example, would be woefully incomplete if it only
compared them as national systems. Such an analysis needs to account for the fact
that both of them, as member states of the European Union, are not only part of the
same legal system, but also exert influence on each other through their mutual role
within EU law. An analysis of corporate law in Vietnam would be incomplete if it
analyzed the legal transplants of US corporate law as a mere transfer between
independent states and not also as an occurrence of imposition reminiscent of
neocolonialism, a direct exertion of regulatory power from the United States (and
other countries) on Vietnam, though the use of experts, education, conditional loans,
etc. An analysis of the use of comparative law in the US Supreme Court cannot
merely look at the court as a representative of the United States at large. It must
instead recognize that such use of foreign sources takes place in a complex setting of
both international relations with foreign countries and non-state actors and intrastate relations with other branches of government and with the individual States.

b) Beyond Positive Law
Second, the waning of legal positivism also has implications on comparative law.
Our studies of law as positive law have clearly become insufficient. We have learned
about the importance of soft law. We are learning, again, that we must take seriously
religious laws. We have learned to take more seriously the fact that the role that
positive law plays in different societies is different. On the one hand, positive law
may have hardly any effect on society in some countries where it enforced
arbitrarily or not at all and where it is considered, by large parts of the society, as
illegitimate. In this regard comparative law is required to take functional
equivalents of positive law into account—cultural norms and societal practices,
rituals, traditions, and so forth. On the other hand, we have learned how activists

and interest groups use even law that is not binding—treaties that have not been
ratified, invocations of human rights that have a global appeal although they are not
binding law—for strategic advances. 8 If we ignore such developments our
comparative law studies become less relevant.

c) Beyond Legal Science
Third, and finally, it is not clear whether a scientific approach to comparative law in
the sense of Rechtswissenschaft can still be maintained (if it ever could). The most
obvious reason is that legal science itself provides no criteria for the evaluation of
law other than those derived from the law itself. It is for this reason that many
comparative studies, while often strong in their country reports, are so vague and
unsatisfying in their actual comparison: they can demonstrate similarities and
differences between legal systems, but their legal arguments can neither explain nor
evaluate these differences, because they are country-specific.
The consequence in contemporary comparative law is, for many, the endorsement
of extralegal sciences, in the hope to achieve neutrality. This explains the rise of
comparative law and economics, especially in the form of statistical comparative
law (somewhat grandiosely called empirical comparative law, as though statistical
data were the only empirical data we have.)9 It also explains the rise of political
science as a disciplinary focus on the materials of comparative law.
This embrace of the social sciences is, in on way, very promising. It helps
comparative lawyers to develop an outside perspective of the law, a way of
measuring it. But this comes, more often than not, with a price.10 Far too often, social
scientific studies in comparative law fall into one of three traps, all related. The first
of those traps is the mere replacement of legal with economic language, with no gain
made. Not much is gained, for example, if we merely replace the comparative law
concept of ‘liability for others’ with that of a principal-agent relation. The second
trap is the collapse into abstract models derived from economic reasoning as the
yardstick against which legal systems are to be measured, because such a priori
systems have little value for the real world. The third trap, finally, is that social
scientific studies often fail to take law seriously in its complexity and specificity.11
Arguably, this turn to the social sciences falls short. By turning to economics and
political science we often merely try to recapture the objectivity that we lost with
the decline of our faith in legal doctrine. We replace legal positivism with social
science positivism and get nowhere closer to a true understanding of legal cultures.
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In order to truly understand the foreign and our relation to it we will have to turn to
other disciplines—cultural anthropology, cultural studies, science and technology
studies. These disciplines have traditionally been hesitant about comparison
because they fear the abstraction inherent in comparison, and they have been
hesitant about the transnational because of their interest in local knowledge. That
fear is not unjustified, and we can learn from it. But we can also, from our
experience, contribute to overcoming it, or at least managing it. Comparison may
always be reductive, but it can be fruitful as long as we remain aware of such
reduction, and as long as we feel we can still generate genuine understanding.

3) The Place of Comparative Law Today
The question for the future of comparative law is misleading. It is exactly the
problem of comparative law is that it, like socialism and paradise, has too often been
promoted as being in the future and not the present, as something yet to come for a
world yet to come. Rather than prepare comparative law for a future that may or
may not come, we should adapt it for a present for which it is in many regards
inadequate. The critique of national parochialism that inspired the 1900 Paris
Congress remains relevant today. But comparative lawyers must also be critical of
those tendencies in globalization that attempt to overcome the state without putting
something else at its place, of new universalizing and totalitarian projects of
governance that deny local cultures and specific experiences, that attempt to replace
local democracy with the delocalized logic of the marketplace. It is our knowledge of
specificities and generalities (the micro and the macro), of differences and
similarities, of diversity and interconnection, that we should bring to the table of
modern governance projects. And we should voice our critique when the ignorance
of such knowledge leads to terrible consequences.
It is tempting to suggest that comparative law has become either useless or
universal. Either we no longer need it (because globalization is anathema) or it has
become universal (we are all comparatists now). We can easily recognize that both
claims are false, and that it would therefore be dangerous to replace comparative
law with something else, be it transnational law, global law, legal pluralism, new
governance, or the like. Between parochial nationalism and totalizing uniformism,
comparative law maintains its important role of distinction and connection, of
creating both proximity and distance, of allowing the other to be other and yet reach
out to it. Comparative law is dead? Long live comparative law!

